Aftermath of Gezi Protests in Turkey

Interview with Murat ÖNOK, associate professor at Koç University Law School, Istanbul. His fields of research are: criminal law, human rights law and international criminal law. Dr. Önok is currently a board member of the Turkish Press Council and of the Turkish Penal Law Association. 

We had this conversation with Murat Onok on the second day after the mass protests broke out in Tbilisi against the foreign agents transparency draft law, submitted to the Parliament of Georgia after last year’s dramatic demonstrations and government’s promise that they took the draft law back and that they will never bring it back again. But a year and a month later, the draft law, dubbed as “Russian” by the opposing civil society, reappeared again. This sparked another round of ongoing protests in Tbilisi, in Batumi and most likely to be spread to other geographies too. 

Turkey has lived under Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rule since 2002. According to the Freedom House latest report Turkey falls in the group of “Not free Countries”, where the government has become increasingly authoritarian, “consolidating significant power through constitutional changes and by imprisoning opponents and critics” (Freedom House). By recalling with Murat the biggest and the longest civil protest that spread throughout Turkey in 2013 we wanted to see the protest trajectory from the very start until the disappearance of last sparks of it. 

“The transcript of this interview has been edited and enriched with the contribution of many academics, contacted by Dr. Önok, who helped to improve the text through their comments. 

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Murat, there are well-known starting dates for the Gezi protests in Istanbul, in 2013. But how did it break out for you personally? Do you remember the moment of thinking that something very big and important was coming?

Yes, as you said, there was a moment when it became a nationwide major event. Although some protestors had started a campaign at Gezi Park a couple of days before, it was at the very end of May that the matter blew up. Istanbul is a very big and crowded city with very little green areas and almost no parks, it is an ocean of buildings. Gezi is a park, right in the heart of Istanbul. The protests were against a town development plan involving the park. The government wanted to make a building in the lack of the requisite construction permit, and also in violation of administrative and judicial decisions not allowing for such construction. It started as a sit-in protest and turned into a massive anti-government protest, which spread to many other cities, as a result of a disproportionately violent intervention by the police against those initial protestors. In fact, there was also police intervention against the then more limited number of protestors in other cities.

When this initial police crackdown took place, I - like most other people in Turkey- knew very little about the people that were trying to save Gezi. It was the use of excessive force that drew all the attention towards Gezi. However, for various reasons, different parts of society had been growing increasingly unhappy with the government and its actions. I would say that this general discontent, together with both the concern for Gezi Park and about defending green areas in general and about the excessive use of force, caused an outburst. There were already a lot of people very unsatisfied with the ruling party AKP thinking that AKP was drifting away from democracy, secularism and the rule of law. So the conjuncture was a perfect combination for societal outbursts back then: the area in the heart of Istanbul was threatened to be destroyed, protesters were ill-treated and the government was not listening to their people. This gave people a chance to react about everything that they were unhappy about. In fact, I should add that not all of the participants were necessarily people opposing the government.

We’ve often seen how demands and slogans might change during various protests after some time; how mildly political slogans might become severely pushy and demanding; for instance, demanding of resigning the government. The slogans and demands during the Gezi protests didn’t reach that extreme point? Do you remember the content of those slogans now?

Of course, there were a lot of anti-governmental and anti-Erdoğan slogans and chanting, and persistent resignation calls. I do not remember the details.

There was a general hope that these protests could lead to “something big”, maybe some even hoped that the government would actually resign. However, at the beginning, I don’t think people had any sort of expectations of that type. And even later on, many people did not have any precise political outcome in mind, they were happy to find a stage to show to the whole world their discontent towards the government. Sometimes you need a channel or a platform through which to express your frustration. It’s like letting some steam out, because you are so overwhelmed and consumed with a feeling of injustice or dissatisfaction. In that sense Gezi was a perfect platform - the whole world is watching you, because of this massive unrest, unprecedented for your country. 

On social media there were “crazy” rumors and urban legends, like that if protests continued for a certain number of days the government would have been forced to resign or that it would have been automatically vacated (!) as a matter of law. But I don’t think that such stupidities motivated many people.

Let’s get back to your personal starting point, what made you join the protests – what was your personal motive?

At the end of May -  I think  it may be 31 May, Friday - I was in my home town of Izmir for an academic event and took the chance to go to a club with friends at night. There we heard allegations of police violence against protesters as we walked out of the club. Suddenly things precipitated: as we were walking in this big avenue, the police in Izmir used massive amounts of pepper spray in the heart of the city against the demonstrators in the vicinity. The gas spread quickly and it got all chaotic with people panicking, and trying to escape. In fact, we were three people and we lost contact with one friend while trying to find shelter against the indiscriminate and excessive use of gas. It was surreal and shocking because up until that moment, I didn’t think that something important was going on. 

For reasons that are still unknown today, the police reacted far too violently to the initial protestors (at the end of May), and seems to have indiscriminately targeted peaceful protesters (incidentally harming bypassers too). However, although there were barricades, people coming flocking to Taksim met with no intervention whatsoever in the following days.

The protests eventually spread to many major cities. More and more people started to go to Taksim, day after day, despite serious interruptions in the public transportation system in order to prevent people from doing so.

I went to Taksim on quite a few occasions. It is hard to remember what was the exact motivation but I can remember a few considerations: wanting to protect Gezi Park, a reaction to the government ignoring the public outcry, a response to police violence, general discontent with the government, wanting to display solidarity with the people out there… Also, around that time part of the population was unhappy with a perceived intervention of the government that started to target a certain “lifestyle” (like the increasing restrictions concerning alcoholic beverages).

There was also a general feeling that you could not “not be there”, you could not “fail” those people that put themselves at risk for a good and just cause. That was the feeling, I guess. Certainly, the criminalizing and disparaging language used by Erdoğan towards the protestors fueled the anger and resolve of the protestors. The failure of the mainstream media to properly report about the events for the first few days - when participation was very high - also angered people.

What was unique about that moment? 

The sense of risk and the sense of unity. We knew that we could face physical intervention by the police. But we also saw that so many people were really unhappy about something in our country and that people were ready to put their incolumity at risk for the sake of making a change. It was also satisfying to see that the government was now very worried. It was especially hope-inspiring to see people coming from very different political, ideological, social, economical… backgrounds were now acting together. So that sense of solidarity, the realization that maybe your efforts together will truly make a difference, that in the end your voice is finally heard, that you are forcing the government to at least take notice of you… To me, those were the driving forces of Gezi.

What did you expect, if there was no sense that Gezi leads to very drastic changes of regime? How did your expectations change throughout the protesting weeks?

When I went there, when my friends went there, it's not like we said that ok, if we keep doing this, a,b,c will happen. Gezi was neither a centralized nor a well-organized movement. The great majority of protests did not have, I believe, any clear idea of what was to follow. Since everything happened so spontaneously there was no initial strategic plan. For instance, if part of the people hoped that the government would resign, what do you do if the government shows no intention to do so? I don’t think that anybody has answers to questions like this. 

There was a hope that these massive protests could lead to a new political atmosphere, maybe a grassroot movement, or that the opposition might find renewed energy and strength. However none of these happened. I think this is because, contrary to what the government believes, there was very little organization behind the protests. Also, political parties, for one reason or another, could not ride the wave of that tide, so to say. The government believes that the Gezi movement had foreign agencies as sponsors and that some Turkish ringleaders acted or were used as instruments to incite and to organize the demonstrators. Today people like businessman Osman Kavala and former MP Can Atalay are detained in relation to those events and for such reasons. However, the average protester - like myself -  did not know anything about people like them back then. Roughly, they have been blamed with trying to forcibly overthrow the government by organizing the Gezi movement.

As time went by and the protests continued I, like many others, obviously realized that this thing had an end. The expectation on my part was that the government would draw a lesson from this and pay more attention to the thoughts and wishes of all parts of the population.  

This conversation is about placing the Gezi protests in the realm of future envisionment - in the intellectual attempt to foresee the trajectories of people’s practice of raising voice against injustice… but before that can we also try to contextualize Gezi protests in the stance of the recent past? How severely rebellious people might become in Turkey, in other words, did Gezi people have had past precedents of street uprisings; something like an embodied collective memory of rebellion that gets reactivated during the Gezi; that works as an unconscious trigger to start another fight, to let your current, accumulated anger pour over the public spaces? 

Turkey has had a history of massive demonstrations before Gezi. And some of them were bloody. However the number of participants, the number of days, and the geographical spread of the Gezi protests was unparalleled and historical. The worldwide media coverage was also something new. In addition, while Turkey has witnessed many street clashes, I don’t think that we could speak of a general “uprising” against the government before Gezi. 

Unfortunately, one legacy of Gezi is the response that the government adopted to make sure that there is no repetition.

Some alleged “ringleaders” such as Kavala and Atalay are in prison. Osman Kavala has been detained since 2017 with the charge of attempting to overthrow the government during the Gezi protests by financing the movement. In 2022 court sentenced Kavala to life imprisonment and seven other activists to 18-year sentences.  The European Court of Human Rights decided that his detention is unlawful and that he should be released, but we have not complied with that judgment. One of the convicted among the above-mentioned seven protesters is another activist, mentioned here already, Can Atalay. The Turkish Constitutional Court decided in his favor three times and he should have been released, but the Turkish Court of Cassation decided not to comply with the judgment of the Constitutional Court and denied his release. This is the first time in history when the Court of the Cassation said that it will not comply with a judgment of the Constitutional Court. 

There have been large (in the sense of number of defendants) criminal cases, where very harsh punishment was at stake, against some groups participating in the events. Amendments were made in the laws in order to grant additional powers to the police and to local governors. New crimes which are applicable to protestors have been introduced. No demonstration has been allowed to take place again at Gezi or Taksim. Massive police presence is in the area. More in general, even small demonstrations are now monitored by the police. 

Demonstrations not notified in advance to the police are dispersed by the police, sometimes by recourse to physical intervention. I have to say that this is unlawful because according to the Turkish constitution, people do not need to obtain “permission” to organize and to hold a demonstration; you just need to “notify” public authorities. However, according to the case law of both the European Court of Human Rights and of the Turkish Constitutional Court, even if you fail to notify, it does not mean that this is an “unlawful” act and that you lose your right to protest. As long as the demonstration is “peaceful” it is lawful. Therefore, it should be allowed to take place. But this is not the practice in Turkey.

On important days, like May 1st, demonstrations are only allowed in a small number of venues decided by the administration. Furthermore, through political statements, it has been made pretty clear that those intending to come up with, or participate in, any sort of future massive demonstration reminiscent of Gezi will pay a heavy price. 

So, today, the streets no longer seem to be a viable option. Through political discourse and the perception created by the pro-governmental media, an impression has been created that taking the streets to protest is unlawful. In fact, even the opposition has fallen for this discourse, maybe for the fear that the majority of the population would regard supporting such demonstrations as illegitimate. All in all, it seems to me that taking the street for making democratic demands has been somewhat criminalized and demonized in the public discourse. 

There is one important notion that I should explain. After the coup of 1980 the state tried to foster an “apolitical generation”. This was done to avoid the type of street clashes that occurred frequently between ideologically opposing fractions before 1980. The Gezi protests were the first street movement for this generation (excluding the Kurdish). Therefore it was seen that this generation too, when authoritarianism and oppression is on the increase, is willing to mobilize and raise its voice. 

The biggest difference after Gezi is that activism “retreated” from the streets and gained more marginal forms. It seems that the government’s plan to convince the youth to an understanding of “conservatism respecting the authority of the state (or the government, in fact)” has succeeded. For example, shortly before Gezi, in 2011, the government had introduced certain restrictions on the use of the internet (security filters and blocking obscene content). This led to large demonstrations across the country. Today there are no such demonstrations in face of similar or more restrictive governmental action. It seems that the government was very successful in preventing a reawakening of street activism by “pairing” or equating such demonstrations with acts of terrorism aimed at the state as a whole.

Today, successful peaceful protests are organized by women, environmentalists and sometimes, the local people of rural areas. And often, on social and even conventional media, these people are labelled as enemies of Turkey, foreign agents, etc.

As a final note, although there were isolated incidents of serious violence committed by protestors, it should be borne in mind that the Gezi movement as a whole aimed to be, and was indeed, a peaceful and non-violent act of civil disobedience.

Can we think of some versions about how Gezi could last so long? I understand how collective consciousness works, when individual responsibility and decision is blurred and when you start feeling yourself to be a part of the crazy wave. But since it lasted for almost three months, there should have been some other markers also employed besides the mere affect of protest, affect of outrage…

I am no expert to answer this question. But a lack of any response from the government that could be deemed satisfactory from the viewpoint of the demonstrators was one reason. The lack of police intervention allowing hundreds of thousands of persons to gather was also a reason. I think that the government relied on the assistance of time: people would eventually grow tired and abandon the protest. 

Also, for many participants these protests became a sort of daily practice and routine, part of their daily schedule and work! There was a “semi-communal” life at Gezi, with quite a lot of people having set up tents there, and taking turns in demonstrating while also continuing their professional activities.

All in all, that many people enjoyed and took great pride in being there, and did not want that vibe to go away. 

Certainly, the civilian casualties (7 persons) caused by the use of force by the police increased people’s resolve in continuing with the protests until they were offered some sort of acceptable remedy and response by the government. 

An unfortunate seminal day was when the Governor of Istanbul stated that there would be no intervention against the demonstrators on that day, and yet a large police intervention was launched. 

The intentional lack of proper coverage by the media was also an enraging factor. In fact, some media workers or celebrities that had the chance to appear on the media used their position or status to support protests aimed at certain media groups. This was a novel type of activism. Regular citizens also demonstrated in front of the buildings of mainstream media that failed to report on the events (such asHabertürk, NTV, CNN). In fact, during one of the most intense first days of the events, CNNTürk aired a pelican documentary (!) instead of dispatching news.

In addition, it may be said that much more peaceful methods of protesting were developed and employed compared to the 1970s. Some examples are the “Standing Man” (a man standing still - frozen - in front of the police), a man taking a mobile piano to Taksim and playing it, “the woman in red” (a woman in a red fancy skirt just turning her face away when indiscriminately targeted by police pepper spray, almost ignoring that act). 

Further, some civilian forums were organized in various parts of Istanbul. They did not last long and did not yield anything concrete. I did not participate in any of those but those who did say that there was no precise target and a lack of organization. 

What other responses were put into action by the government? In other words, if we say that Gezi was also a lesson for the government, what was their homework to do besides detaining activists to put them on court trials, convicting them and imprisoning them?

Today it seems to me that AKP’s overall response was to make sure that no one could repeat Gezi again, that no one could risk taking over the streets because of the fear of suffering serious adverse consequences, including the loss of personal freedom. 

In that sense, the sort of lesson that protestors wished the government to learn fell on deaf ears.

To give more concrete examples to some of the legal measures adopted after Gezi, now a governor, under certain conditions (such as “the existence of indicia showing that public order or security has been breached or can be breached in such way as to stop or interrupt ordinary life”) is able to order certain measures, such as restricting for up to 15 days the entry or exit to certain places or may regulate or restrict the gathering or circulation of persons or the navigation of vehicles in certain places or hours. Failure to abide by any such measure can lead to imprisonment. According to another rule, if you participate in any public demonstration by covering your face with the aim to conceal your identity, this act by itself is a crime requiring a minimum of two years and six months of imprisonment. It does not have to be a violent protest. You don’t have to have committed any (other) crime. Mere participation in any demonstration by covering your face with the purpose to conceal your identity is a crime. 

According to an amended provision of the Police Law, the police has been given the authority to directly use firearms in case of an attempt to attack public property. This is certainly a very “deterring” and “scary” provision.

The transfer of the strongest media group, Dogan Medya, to the very pro-governmental Demirören group also marked a decisive difference which allowed the AKP to hegemonize and direct the public discourse and societal perceptions. 

A new crime punishing the intentional public spreading of “information misleading the people” has also been introduced recently. 

And now there are plans to incorporate into the Turkish Penal Code a prohibition on foreign agency/influence. The wording of the provision is rather elastical and the penalties are really harsh. This is very new information that has not yet been the topic of much political or academic debate in Turkey.

Can you recall for us one or two examples of a protest that happened after Gezi. I still insist that just because it was so big, it should have left some positive experience, something to build a new activist experience on.

Unfortunately, since Gezi there has not been any major protest of a similar scale in Turkey. 

However a major demonstration was the “Justice Walk”, organized by the main opposition party, which spanned many Turkish cities, starting on 15th of June 2017 in Ankara and culminating with a massive meeting in Istanbul on July 9th. The Chairman of the main opposition party walked for 450 km, and throughout the event thousands of people accompanied him.

There have been some other demonstrations too after Gezi, of course. I recall quite a few protests about environmental issues such as the operation of mines or dams and/or practices leading to deforestation. I don’t recall any major protest directly and exclusively aimed at the government. 

Women organizations have been very active on every 8 March. However, after a night rally that they organized at Istiklal Avenue (which is in Taksim), no one was allowed again to hold any meeting in Taksim. Very strong precautions are now taken every year by the police to prevent women from accessing Taksim on that day.

There have been various local protests. For example you hear that a company (that is sometimes known to be close to the government) has obtained a license to perform industrial business in a village and that they will have to harm the environment to do so. Local people protest and police go there, activists and reporters go there – that’s how it starts, but it is usually on a small scale because it happens in a small village, and small, isolated local protests don’t expand to other places. As far as I remember these local protests did not produce results for the protestors. You mentioned the Georgian protest movement that was able to win the case against the government, here in Turkey I do not remember any major win like that. 

Independent, in-depth reporting of the media can’t activate this process either. Generally, the media in Turkey is extremely divided and extremely politicized; so pro-government media that is financed by the government and public institutions immediately criminalizes protests and they only show the bad side of protestors like examples of violence. The opposition media is also very biased, they would usually focus only on the problematic side of the governmental response, such as police violence. I would say that almost all of the media here is seriously biased. It is only about the level of that bias: some are ridiculously biased, others are less.

There are many issues that have led to serious public reaction, such as allegations of corrupt practices and/or mismanagement of public funds, the deteriorating economy, unequal distribution of wealth, etc. However, dissatisfaction about these matters has not led to mass protests. And as I told you, the government makes sure not to allow it. So, probably there will never be anything close to Gezi again. 

When did it all end for you personally, and what was the emotion that followed - was it a sense of frustration or still an achievement?

Officially, the protests ended towards the end of August. However, personally, the Istanbul leg - which was the center of attention for the world - ended for me already in June. I can’t recall my exact reasoning. However, the police raided and emptied Gezi, and eventually Taksim, in Mid-June. That is when the movement lost its thrust.

I turned to social media activism instead of street activism. In any case, the participation had already decreased. 

For me, the point had been made abundantly clear, and there was not much more to obtain by continuing with a prolonged occupation of the center of the city. In addition, these protests inevitably became a fertile ground for provocateurs and extreme fractions so there was a lot of unwarranted violence and vandalism such as damage to public and private property (such as breaking glasses and even burning down public transportation vehicles).

In any case, in July I was not - as far as I remember - in Istanbul for most of the time.

After the Gezi people saw that they needed to convert this tide into something that had a political framework. But that did not happen. First, because the government was very quick to criminalize the whole protest and to accuse everyone that the protestors were trying to forcibly overthrow the government. Secondly, because some political parties did not support (or only supported partially) the movement, and even those who supported the protest were somewhat equivocal, trying not to look too much in favor of the protesters or not to damage their own reputation in the eyes of the public majority. The civilian forums that I mentioned above might have been a substitute or continuation of the Gezi but they were totally ineffective.

The overall feeling immediately after Gezi was, I believe, one of pride. And the movement produced some tangible results too. The establishment that was intended to be built could not be built (and it is still so) and trees are still standing there in Gezi. Even apart from that there was a major sense of victory. It was a sense of victory probably because for the first time the government had to pay attention to sections of the people that they had been ignoring. A government that gave us the impression that we do not exist for them or that “we the millions” are a minority that can be overlooked was forced to take note of our voice. 

Murat, how do people like you, motivated to make positive changes, function in a limited environment that authoritative regime shapes for its citizens? 

Certainly it is frustrating, but it depends on how you view these impediments. I am a resilient person who does not give up.  I believe that if you fight you might lose, but you cannot achieve anything without fighting for it. Fighting for the right cause offers no guarantee of victory, but not fighting and giving up guarantees defeat! Thus your only option to achieve things is to fight. 

In addition, I am a lawyer and an academic. The situation in Turkey means that I have more to fight for  - and therefore more that I can obtain - than my colleagues in Western Europe for example. That is because they already have more than what we have in terms of democracy and the rule of law. They don’t need to endeavor as much but I do. 

It is not an ideal reality but it is one that I have to come to terms with. These thoughts motivate me. I believe that certain changes must take place for a stronger Turkey and for our people to be more happy and free.

Maybe one thing worthy of note is that in the past few local and general elections a very huge number of volunteers have assumed official or unofficial duties in order to safeguard the security and integrity of the elections. I have also done so on numerous occasions.

What are your arenas for your everyday fight, Murat?

Because I am an academic, I have the chance to lecture at university and to make oral presentations across Turkey, to write things that people read. Social media is also very vibrant in Turkey. Both my profession and social media (and sometimes conventional media) offer me daily avenues to share my thoughts. Because I have an academic title people might be more likely to listen to me; but even if I were any random citizen I would still have had a duty to speak out for what I deem to be the correct course of action. After all every one of us is one single human being with a voice. Each one of us can speak to people around us to explain to them why -we believe something is right or wrong. I don’t expect people to be heroes. But I do expect everyone to try to act right on an individual basis. If everyone acts in that consciousness and keeps his or her own hands clean, that should suffice for everything to change! On a personal basis, even if I were to ultimately fail to bring about any change, as long as I’ve done what I could and as long as I managed to preserve what I believed to be the moral high ground, I will sleep as a happy man. 

The recent elections in Turkey - what did it change?

Psychologically it already did. Literally, political opponents are now walking with their heads high and with renewed belief in a different future. Will the results change Erdogan? He said he got the message. He is a very experienced and pragmatic politician. I think he knows that he needs to analyze all the criticism directed at him,  and that more and more people want one thing or another to truly change. But what will he do for a change? Will it  mean more democracy? Or will it mean even more attempts to control everything? Will he just change those around him in the government or does he intend to change some of his ways and, for example, listen more to the opposition and to NGOs? We’ll have to see. 

Bureaucracy may become bolder and more assertive against politics. Maybe it can have an impact on the judiciary too, a judiciary that seems to have become less and less attentive to fundamental rights and freedoms. 

Can he be expected to do these things to democratize the whole process? 

In my opinion he lost votes because of the poor economy. It was not because of other shortcomings such as the democratic deficit or poor compliance with human rights standards. I don’t think those factors were decisive in the result. However, scholars always argue that a poor economy is a direct result of a lack of democracy and a lack of the rule of law. So Erdogan might think that he needs better democracy and more rule of law to improve the economy. If he realizes that, he has a chance to turn things around. But if he does not see the connection between those, he will have a very hard time changing the tide.

In any case, I don’t think that the government will change their approach concerning protests and demonstrations. Erdogan thinks that many of these protests are coordinated by criminal circles, that they are maneuvered by foreign interventionists and that people out there are being manipulated and used by enemies of Turkey. I think he really believes this narrative. For example, the general idea within the government is that the movement for LGBTQI rights is a Western plan to destroy the traditional Turkish family structure and this seems to resonate strongly with the majority of the Turkish electorate. 

But then again, if you start losing popular support, you have to make some concessions and you have to accept certain demands that you had been rejecting in the past. Maybe, that’s the process we will be witnessing. If that is the case, it would certainly help everyone - Erdoğan and the people of Turkey.

For some time now the AKP has been pushing for a new constitution. It is to be seen if this effort will lead to a change in the constitutional regime. Will the opposition be allowed to participate actively in the process? Will the new constitution be more libertarian? Or is the whole effort aimed, in reality, at changing the system so as to consolidate power even further? Only Erdoğan and his close entourage have the answers.

Photo: OSMAN ORSAL/REUTERS